The Chinese room argument builds on the premise that there is a meaningful difference between "simulating" intelligence and possessing it.
If you "execute" the program manually, you may still not understand Chinese, but the program still does. The room, including you and the program, is functionally a single entity that speaks Chinese. The human is an implementation detail as much as the grey matter is an implementation detail in a Chinese speaking human.
Searle's argument that the machine does not actually possess "understanding" is simply special pleading. Unless he can define "understanding" in a meaningful way, the difference between an "understanding" entity and a "simulating" entity is non-existent.
These arguments all boil down to unscientific armchair philosophy. I have no idea why people seem to accept them as meaningful other than that the people who came up with them or wrote about them are otherwise highly regarded -- but that's literally an argument from authority.
If you "execute" the program manually, you may still not understand Chinese, but the program still does. The room, including you and the program, is functionally a single entity that speaks Chinese. The human is an implementation detail as much as the grey matter is an implementation detail in a Chinese speaking human.
Searle's argument that the machine does not actually possess "understanding" is simply special pleading. Unless he can define "understanding" in a meaningful way, the difference between an "understanding" entity and a "simulating" entity is non-existent.
These arguments all boil down to unscientific armchair philosophy. I have no idea why people seem to accept them as meaningful other than that the people who came up with them or wrote about them are otherwise highly regarded -- but that's literally an argument from authority.